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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from proceedings before the Industrial Commission which resulted in a 
determination that Ciaimant/ Appeilanl, (hereinafter "Mr. Rodriguez"), was entitled to permanent 
total disability benefits pursuant to the Odd-Lot doctrine. 
B. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
With one exception, Mr. Rodriquez accepts the Appellants' (hereinafter "Employer") 
summary of proceedings below. While it is obviously true that the Commission entered a split 
decision in this matter, Employer's assertion that the split opinion is "relatively rare" is unfounded, 
unquantifiable (rare relative to what?) and irrelevant. The split in the Commission may signal 
that the decision was a close call but it does not demonstrate that the majority decision was based 
on an error of law or that it was not based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
C. FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Because this is a case involves a conflict in the evidence relevant to the Commission's 
determinations, it is one that turns upon the Commission's perception of the credibility of the 
witnesses and it must therefore be resolved in Mr. Rodriguez's favor if there is substantial 
competent evidence to support the Commissions conclusions. Given these circumstances, Mr. 
Rodriguez will set out below facts, from the record, which provide the appropriate support for the 
Commission's findings and which highlights notes the evidence essential to the proof of 
Employer's claims which is absent from the record. 
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was  On February 7. 201 when Krafft 
was stable (and 
three months shy years of 
Commissions detem1ination of total disability attached) he was 
According to Employer's vocational expert. herself fluent in 
Spanish, Mr. Rodriguez has "very, very, very basic vocational English." Deposition of Mary 
Barros-Bailey Ph.D., February 3, 2015. 12:2-5 (hereinafter "Depo Barros-Bailey"). 
Mr. Rodriguez attended school through the fifth grade in Mexico. He has worked in crop 
fields (beans and corn) in Mexico, Boise Tr. 20:4-22, in orchards in the United States (pruning 
trees and picking fruit), Boise Tr. 22:5-18, and, with Employer, in various tasks associated with 
its hops fam1ing operation for nearly 21 years. Boise Tr. 24: 19 - 27: 12. His work for Employer 
was generally seasonal Boise Tr.25:4-24, but involved a lot of overtime and on average more than 
the 2080 hours per year typically associated with full time work. Exhibit 30 pp. 804-805. In the 
last 5 full years of employment with Employer, Mr. Rodriquez worked between 2,402.81 and 
3,614.92 hours per year and earned between $27,152.77 and $34,161.03. Id. 
While working for Employer he performed most of the jobs associated with operating a 
hops farm. Boise Tr.24:4-17. Some of the work was simple, some was physically demanding and 
all of it involved active use of both hands. Boise Tr. 26: 18 27: 12. In the last five years of his 
employment with Employer his primary responsibility was to deal with and oversee the drip 
iITigation system - a job which required strength in both hands. Boise Tr. 29: 10-17. But hops 
farming involves a lot of activities which are more demanding than managing a drip irrigation 
system. Seasonal work begins with field work and trellis work in March and continues through 
processing and baling of the hops cones in November. CDA Tr. 56:6 to 58:13. In 2010, Employer 
had about 18 - 25 full time/year around employees. It added another 80 to 125 people when the 
"core group" came on board in early spring. For the summer months the total work force would 
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to 100 and then increased for harvest to about 220 people. After harvest, 
in mid-September labor reduced back to 
of 100 until the trellis and tractor work was completed. CDA Tr.59: 19 to 60: 11. 
Obviously, before the crops are in the ground and after the hops were harvested irrigation 
system maintenance is a virtually non-existent task. The "core group" which works before planting 
and through the fall had to work with machinery (both field machinery and harvest and processing 
machinery) and to do a lot of hand work maintaining the trellises. See, e.g. Boise Tr. 28: 16 - 31 :22 
and 52: 11 - 53: 13. This phenomena lead to Mr. Rodriguez being assigned to work with the 
machinery, including the one which crushed his hand on September 8, 2010. Boise Tr. 32:13 -
33: 16. While Mr. Rodriguez was, prior to his injury, part of the "core group," no one testified 
that there would be sufficient work available for him to remain a part of this March to November 
"core group" if he had returned to work. In fact, it appears that his function would have been 
limited to supervising the maintenance and operation of the irrigation system during the growing 
portion of the production year. CDA Tr. 68:3-18. Consequently, any job that was made to 
accommodate his limitations would have involved a much shorter season of work and a good deal 
less job security. 
While Employer's current manager, Mr. Atkins, indicated that the job he planned on 
creating would have been primarily as a supervisor, he indicated that it would involve some hands-
on work during times of reduced acreage and could become less physically demanding during 
years when higher acreage was in production. CDA Tr. 65:6-17 and 70:16-3. Mr. Atkins, 
considered himself a friend of Mr. Rodriguez CDA Tr.62: l 0-18 and perceived that Mr. Rodriguez 
has developed expertise which, given other lay-offs, was of value to Employer. CDA Tr. 68: 19 
69: 12. Clearly, Mr. Atkins was willing to attempt to fashion a job that Rodriguez could succeed 
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at job was actually described and approved by any 
or other health care Rodriguez's 
was, the industry of hops farming, such value as to make him employable m a 
supervisory/low physical demand job with any other hops farming operation. While there is 
evidence that Employer made a written job offer to Mr. Rodriguez, Joint Exhibit 685 (hereinafter 
"J. Ex") and Boise, Tr. 51:14 - 52:1, this document does not identify an i1Tigation supervisor 
position and only identifies jobs which involved physical activity beyond Mr. Rodriguez's 
capabilities. Boise, Tr. 69: 18 - 70:5. 
At the time of the hearing in Coeur d'Alene the full allotment of acreage dedicated to hops 
was being utilized (1700). However, during the 2010 and 2011 crop years only 300 acres were in 
hops production. The hops production acreage begin scaling up for the 2012 crop year. CDA Tr. 
55:17-55:2 and 68:3-15. While Mr. Atkins testified that during the scaling up and full production 
phases of the business cycle there could be a position limited to irrigation supervision, he also 
testified that during downsizing years they had to let go other fully capable workers who 
understood the irrigation system. CDA Tr. 68:21 - 69:8. No one testified that a non-physical job 
limited to irrigation supervision, nor any other job that Rodriguez could perform, would be 
available in low production years with Employer or with any other hops from in the State of Idaho. 
1 While Mr. Atkin's intention to make work for Mr. Rodriguez is laudable, he is not one of 
Employer's owners and it is not at all clear that he has the capacity to bind Employer to a 
contract with Mr. Rodriguez. This being the case it is important to consider both the sincerity of 
the intent to make work (resolved in Employer's favor) but also the economic feasibility of that 
intent. Reality teaches that sooner or later the Balance Sheet comes into play and that when this 
happens the least productive workers are the first to go. Likely, a work who has very limited 
functionality and whose defined job is not the norm within the industry is most likely to be 
considered and expendable luxury by those looking only at the bottom line. 
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1s is that Rodriguez, who knew the business well, did not think that Employer could 
a job that he could do. Boise 55: 19-58:20, and CDA 
Conflicting evidence was presented to the Commission about the extent or Mr. Rodriguez's 
limitations and employability but there are some relevant matters about which there is no dispute. 
Mr. Rodriguez suffered a severe injury to his dominant (right) hand and arm which lead to six 
surgeries, extensive physical therapy and permanent physical limitations and restrictions. FOF, R. 
9, #6. In 2011, before his final surgery (which occurred in September 2011, Boise Tr.39:5 to 
40:2), Mr. Rodriguez attempted a return to work with Employer but he testified that the effort was 
not successful and in fact revealed the need for another surgery. Boise Tr.41: 15-42:25. Mr. 
Rodriguez identified many of the problems that he encountered in his attempt to return to work in 
interviews with Terry Montague. Deposition Terry L. Montague, M.A., December 17, 2014, p.52:9 
- 53:4 (hereinafter, "Depa Montague"). Following his sixth surgery the problems with his hand 
initially worsened and he begin to experience cramping in his hand. Boise Tr. 42:23 - 43: 11. In 
2012, he declined any further attempt to return to work, because of pain, the effect of pain on his 
ability to function and his consumption of pain medication, the effect of the medication and the 
substantially decreased flexibility, strength and pain free function in his hand and arm. Boise 
Tr.43: 19 - 44: 19 and 70:6-21. In fact, based upon his limitations he gave up any hope of being 
able to return to productive work and applied for and obtained Social Security disability benefits. 
Boise Tr. 46:14 47:11. The difficulties related to loss of function and pain continued to be 
present and disturbingly limiting as of the time of the hearing in Boise, Tr.47:23-50:2. 
While there has been some improvement in the flexibility and functionality of his right 
hand following the sixth surgery, as indicated by a Functional Capacity Evaluation performed at 
St. Alphonsus Rehabilitation (STARS), Exhibit 15, it is clear that that flexibility and functionality 
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comes at 
STARS 
111 form of 
and 
discomfort which is acknowledged but not 
conclusion that can return to into 
employment. J. 15, p. 00496. However, no one testified that Mr. Rodriquez's complaints 
of sever and limiting pain were without basis in fact or that they were of psychological origin. 
Also not acknowledge by STARS or factored in to its conclusion is the evidence that Mr. 
Rodriguez has begun to develop an over use injury in his left shoulder. FO F, R.16, #23. 
The record of the case contains a good deal of conflicting evidence and opinion testimony 
which is adequately identified in the Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, And 
Order And Dissenting Opinion relative to the contents of and the inadequacies of the job site 
evaluations that were done, the conflicts in the Functional Capacity Evaluations that were done, 
the conflicts in the medical opinions relative to limitations and employability and the conflicts in 
opinions of the vocational experts relative to Mr. Rodriguez's capacity to work and his capacity to 
find employment. There is little to be gained by recounting this conflicting information here. It 
will suffice to note that there is information and opinion testimony that will support about every 
conclusion ranging from Mr. Rodriguez can return to work at his pre-injury job (Dr. Krafft) to, 
given the confluence of medical and non-medical factors, Mr. Rodriguez is not capable competing 
in the open labor market and would not be capable of securing and maintaining gainful 
employment. Depo. Montague, p.32:19-33:4. 
Relying upon portions of the evidence and testimony the Commission found that if Mr. 
Rodriquez did not fall within the Odd-Lot, he is 57% disabled. FOF R. 32 #67. This determination 
was based in part upon the fact that he has, according to Employer's expert, Mr. Rodriguez lost 
access to up to 83% of the labor market available to him before the injury. Depo. Barros-Bailey 
p.48:18 - 49:7 (hereinafter "Depo Barros-Bailey") and J. Ex. #28, p.774. Ms. Barros-Bailey 
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the to was a "small pool" it 
might take him a while to find a job but she concluded that jobs do exist for him. Dcpo Barros-
Bailey In support of her position she testified about finding agricultural labor jobs for 
amputees and people with back injuries Depo Barros-Bailey pp.15:3-11 and 18:4-19, but she never 
testified that she could correlate any of these individuals to the particular challenges faced by Mr. 
Rodriguez and she did not identify a single job for which he, given his particular challenges, could 
effectively compete. 
There does seem to be across the board agreement that Mr. Rodriguez's best chance for 
gainful employment resided in the possibility that Mr. Atkins could in fact fashion, what would 
apparently be unique within the industry, an irrigation supervisor position which would prove to 
be more than a "make work" job that would be economically feasible even when market conditions 
were cycling downward or bottomed out. See, Depo Montague p.38:15-19. 
While a significant part of the testimony supporting a finding that Mr. Rodriguez falls 
within the Odd-Lot comes from Mr. Rodriguez, the Commission's findings indicate that it found 
him (and that the Referee found him) to be a credible witness. FOF, R. 29, #61. The Commission 
noted that Mr. Rodriguez perceives that he is not able to be a dependable employee, FOF, R. 10 
#8. This is consistent with his testimony that his capacity to use his right hand and arm varied 
from day to day, his pain levels fluctuated and often substantially limited the use of his arm and 
that the medications he took to address that pain caused him to feel impaired. Tr. 47:23 - 50:2 
Employer has not challenged this determination regarding Mr. Rodriguez's credibility nor has it 
made any attempt to challenge Claimant's credibility in any regard. In fact, the Commission noted 
that Mr. Atkins viewed Mr. Rodriguez as a desirable worker in part because of his work ethics and 
his attitude. FOF, R. 22, # 59. 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
any it were 
answered by the Industrial Commission? 
Is there substantial competent evidence to support the Industrial Commission's finding that 
Mr. Rodriguez is totally and pennanently disabled by virtue of having established a prima 
facie case for application of the Odd-Lot Doctrine? 
Is there substantial competent evidence to support the Industrial Commission's finding that 
Employer failed its burden to prove that Mr. Rodriguez should be disqualified from the 
Odd-Lot because there was a suitable job that was regularly and continuously available to 
him? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
As will be evident to the reader it is Mr. Rodriguez's contention that all that Employer has 
done in this appeal is to ask this Court to reweigh the evidence. As such Mr. Rodriguez contends 
that it appropriate to award attorney fees and costs to him pursuant to I.C. § 72-804. Duncan v. 
Navajo Trucking, 134 Idaho 202, 204, 998 P.2d 1115, 1117 (2000). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Rodriguez has no particular dispute with that portion of the relevant standard of review 
as are set out in Employer's' Brief, p.13. Mr. Rodriguez does however note that a complete 
statement of the relevant standard ofreview includes this Court's recognition that: 
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Llvv,u.u" the is the conclusions on the credibility and weight of 
the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. This Court 
does not the evidence or consider whether it would have reached a different 
from evidence omitted) 
Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Center 136 Idaho 579, 583, 38 P.3d 617,621 (2001). 
Also, particular to this case, Odd-lot status is only a question oflaw only if the evidence is 
undisputed and is reasonably susceptible to only one interpretation. Where the evidence is 
disputed Odd-Lot status is a question of fact for the Commission. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 
145 Idaho 302,310, 179 P.3d 265,273 (2008). 
B. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The controverted facts of this case gave rise to a need for the Commission to make two 
factual determinations which are at issue in this appeal. In making these determinations the 
Commission manifested an awareness of the applicable law and the appropriate legal standards. 
The first of those factual determinations was whether Rodriguez, vested with the burden of doing 
so, established a prima facie case a finding that he was totally and permanently disabled under the 
Odd-Lot Doctrine. The second of those factual determinations was whether Employer, vested with 
the burden of doing so, demonstrated that there was a suitable job which was regularly and 
continuously available to the claimant. See, e.g. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302,310, 
179 P.3d 265, 273 (2008). 
These two factual determinations are related in the sense that the second only needs to be 
made when the first has been decided in the claimant's favor. However, they are two different 
determinations which turn on two different legal standards. Employer has conflated these 
determinations and as a consequence not correctly evaluated each determination independently 
based upon the appropriate standard and appropriate burden. The impact of Employer's failure to 
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standards 
inclination to 
to factual 
that support 
IS 
outcome 
instead of attempting to demonstrate that the determinations as made by the Commission are not 
supported by substantial and competent facts. 
When these critical determinations of fact are, in the light of the evidence actually in the 
record, reviewed through the applicable legal lens, it is apparent that the Industrial Commission 
understood the applicable law, correctly applied the applicable law and that it not only reached 
conclusions supported by substantial and competent evidence, but in some case the Commission 
reached the only conclusions that are sustainable. 
C. THE ODD-LOT DOCTRINE AND RELATED LEGAL STANDARDS 
The first five pages of the Argument section of the Appellants' Brief discuss the "history' 
of what has been, since 1977 referred to as the Odd-Lot Doctrine. Appellants'' Brief pp. 13 - 18. 
Employer does not appear during this opening section of its Brief to identify any legal standard 
which the Commission did not recognize, appreciate and apply. This is a curious opening 
argument in a case involving a doctrine which has been fully formed and repeatedly discussed and 
relied upon since at least 1989, See, Huerta v. Sch. Dist. No. 431, 116 Idaho 43, 49, 773 P.2d 1130, 
1136 (1989), and which by definition turns, where there is conflicting evidence, upon factual 
determinations. Bybee v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 82,921 P.2d 1200, 1206 
(1996). 
The language used and the arguments imbedded in the recitation of "History" carry some 
clues of what may be the intention underlying the lengthy recitation of history. For example, 
Employer articulates a "traditional" approach to the law of disability as set out in the applicable 
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of judicial - the Odd-Lot doctrine. Appellants' Brief 
1 14. the Odd has since at 1989, 
one would think it has become tradition. Indeed this Court has previously held that because it 
is appropriate to assume that the Idaho Legislature has been and continues to be aware of this 
Court's interpretation and application of the laws of Idaho, it is also appropriate to presume 
legislative concurrence with those interpretations or applications where the Legislature has not 
subsequently acted to change or modify the law. Pfau v. Comair Holdings, Inc., 135 Idaho 152, 
156, 15 P .3d 1160, 1164 (2000). This being the case any intention to suggest or intimate that this 
case presents an opportunity to reject the Odd-Lot Doctrine lacks footing in the established law of 
Idaho. Given 27 years oflegislative sessions in which the Odd-Lot Doctrine has not been modified 
or nullified by legislative action, the fleet has long since sailed on an assertion that the Doctrine is 
the product of unfounded judicial activism. 
Similarly, Employer characterizes the "futility" method for establishing a primafacie basis 
for the application of the Odd-Lot Doctrine as something which has "evolved over the years." 
This assertion is not supported by reference to any cases which demonstrate evidence of such an 
evolution. What is clear is that the "futility' method was first articulated in Carey v. Clearwater 
County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109, 113, 686 P.2d 54, 56 (1984). It was subsequently expressly 
incorporated as one of the three methods for establishing a prima facie basis for the application of 
the Odd-Lot Doctrine. Huerta, supra. Since Huerta ( decided in 1989) the three methods of 
triggering the application of the Odd-Lot Doctrine have been oft repeated and left unchanged. See, 
e.g. Sevy v. SVL Analytical, Inc., 159 Idaho 578, 364 P.3d 279, 287 (2015), reh'g denied (Jan. 28, 
2016). The articulation of the "futility" method - proving that "efforts to find suitable employment 
would have been futile" has likewise been unchanged for at least 27 years. Compare, Huerta 116 
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p 11 11 , 159 Idaho 686,364 P 
challenge to the Doctrine it 
has not been a long standing, and easily predictable means of determining total disability is 
wholly unfounded. 
Employer's final attempt to disparage the Odd-Lot Doctrine actually reveals the heart of 
Employer's dispute with the Commission's Decision. In this regard, Employer asserts, ipse dixit, 
the "futility" method has become a prominent means for supporting application of the Odd-Lot 
Doctrine and that claimants are increasingly seeking to establish futility through the testimony of 
a vocational consultant. Employer does not make any attempt to point to a factual basis for this 
assertion. Moreover, it neither attempts to demonstrate why this an improper means of proving 
futility nor to cite any case that even questions this approach to proving futility. Rather, Employer 
challenges this approach on the basis that it can lead to a determination that the testimony about 
futility offered by one vocational consultant retained by one party can be treated as substantial, 
competent and credible evidence regardless of the fact that the other party offers what it considers 
to be contradicting testimony from other vocational consultants. Apparently, Employer would 
have this Court conclude that \Vorker's Compensation proceedings should be litigated as Medieval 
Com purgation proceedings in which the sheer volume of sworn oaths outweighs any determination 
of substantiality, competency and credibility. Not only is this assertion not supported by any 
citation of law, it is clearly contrary to the prevailing rules of jurisprudence in Idaho and this 
Nation. 
In the final analysis, while Employer may be trolling for the very "judicial activism" it 
seems to consider disreputable, the Odd-Lot Doctrine is firmly and soundly entrenched in Idaho 
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more now 
that: 
The odd-lot doctrine expands disability by recognizing that total disability does not mean 
"the injured person must be absolutely helpless or entirely unable to do anything worthy 
of compensation" but "[a]n employee who is so injured that he can perform no services 
other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably 
stable market for them docs not exist may vvell be classified as totally disabled." ... The 
claimant bears the burden of proving a prima facie case of odd-lot status, which requires: 
(1) that the claimant "attempted other types of employment without success;" or (2) that 
the claimant, "or vocational counselors or employment agencies on his or her behalf, have 
searched for other work and other work is not available; or (3) that any efforts to find 
suitable employment would be futile." 
Compare, Sevy v. SVL Analytical, Inc., supra, with Dumaw v. JL. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 
150, 153, 795 P.2d 312, 315 (1990). 
With respect to the Surety/Employer's burden this Court had repeatedly stated: 
Once a claimant has satisfied the burden of proving a prima facie case of odd-lot status, 
the burden shifts to the employer ... to prove the claimant's employability." Employer 
cannot meet its burden by merely showing that Claimant is able to perform some type of 
work. "The odd-lot category is for those workers who are so injured that they can perform 
no services other than those that are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a 
reasonably stable market for them does not exist." "Such workers need not be physically 
unable to perform any work at all. They are simply not regularly employable in any well-
known branch of the labor market absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on their part." Employer 
must show "there is an actual job within a reasonable distance from [Claimant's] home 
which he is able to perform or for which he can be trained" and that he "has a reasonable 
opportunity to be employed at that job." "It is of no significance that there is a job 
[Claimant] is capable of performing if he would in fact not be considered for the job due 
to his injuries, lack of education, lack of training, or other reasons. (Citations omitted) 
Compare, Tarbet v. JR. Simplot Co., 151 Idaho 755,760,264 P.3d 394,399(2011), with 
Reifsteck v. Lantern Motel & Cafe, 101 Idaho 699, 701, 619 P .2d 1152, 1154 ( 1980). 
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L Employer has failed to identify a single "question of law" for resolution 
on this appeal. 
As noted above, Employer's discussion of the history of the "Odd-Lot" doctrine, other than 
generally and subtly disparaging the Odd-Lot doctrine, makes no effort to challenge neither the 
Doctrine itself nor the Commission's recognition of its parameters and the applicable legal 
standards. The only other aspect of the Appellant's Brief which might be seen as presenting a 
question oflaw appears in conjunction with Employer's argument that Mr. Atkins professed and 
apparently genuine willingness to do whatever it took to fashion a one of a kind job which Mr. 
Rodriguez could perform prevents a finding that it was "futile" for Mr. Rodriguez to seek 
employment. Employer asserts, ipse dixit, that it was error for the Commission to find a prima 
facie showing "futility" in the face of such evidence and challenges the Commission's 
determination as not being based upon any precedent. Appellants' Brief, p.18.2 
Given the record in this case and the established law in Idaho, it is clear that the established 
law of Idaho, which was recognized by the Commission, provides an adequate foundation for 
addressing the impact of evidence of a specific job offer in a case in which the claimant is seeking 
2 Employer's argument in this regard is premised upon characterizing the job that 
Employer was willing to fashion for Mr. Rodriguez as a "viable return-to-work offer." Employer 
has not cited a single case or commentator which defines, for the purposes of proceedings 
involving the Odd-Lot doctrine the term "viable return-to-work." Probably this is because the 
possible presence of a single job is not relevant to the determination of whether a prima facie case 
has been made to demonstrate that the claimant more probably than not cannot compete in the 
open employment market. In any event, in concluding that Employer has not shown that the job 
was suitable to Mr. Rodriguez's physical limitations nor continuously and regularly available to 
him, the Commission would seem to have concluded that the return-to-work offer was not 
"viable." 
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to case to an in the cases discussing 
a prima is appropriate evidence demonstrates m 
combination the medical and non-medical factors prevent the claimant from effectively competing 
for work in any reasonably stable job market or from being regularly employable in any well-
known branch of the labor market. See, e.g., Tarbet v. JR. Simplot Co., supra. These are 
generalized inquiries that consider job markets and hiring practices but do not consider jobs that 
may be available to the claimant because of unusual factors such as a business boom or uncommon 
employer motivations. See, e.g., Tarbet, Id. Indeed, a claimant can be found to fall within the Odd-
Lot even where there is evidence that there are some jobs he is capable of performing. Sevy v. SVL 
Analytical, Inc., supra. Thus, applying existing standards it is apparent that the fact that Employer 
demonstrated to the Commission that Mr. Atkins was serious about fashioning a one of a kind job 
which Mr. Rodriguez could perform is not relevant to a determination of whether taken together 
the medical and non-medical factors present in this case can properly be found to preclude Mr. 
Rodriguez from competing for work in the general labor markets that would otherwise be open to 
him. Employer has not cited a single case or commentator for the proposition that in determining 
whether the claimant has made a prima facie showing to support an Odd-Lot finding, the 
Commission should give any weight to evidence which demonstrates that in a time of business 
growth, the time-of-injury employer is willing to fashion a one of a kind job for the claimant to 
perform. 
Such particularized evidence of a single job opportunity, while not relevant to the 
generalized determination underlying the prima facie Odd-Lot case, is not excluded altogether 
from consideration in Odd-Lot cases. If the Commission determines, as it did here, that a prima 
facie showing had been made and that the claimant appears to fall within the Odd-Lot, then the 
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opportunity to show that the claimant should be excluded because there is an 
is able to perform and that he has a reasonable opportunity to be 
employed at that job. Here, Employer had the opportunity to convince the 
Commission that the job Mr. Atkins was contemplating for Mr. Rodriguez was such a job. It failed 
to do so, not because the Commission did not understand and properly apply the existing law. It 
failed to do so in part because it failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the desired finding 
and in part upon factual determinations made by the Commission. 
2. There is Substantial and Competent Evidence to Support the 
Commission's Determination that Claimant Established a Prima Facie 
case for inclusion in the Odd-Lot. 
It is well established that the Odd-Lot Doctrine affords protection for those workers who, 
may not be completely unable to work but who are "so injured that they can perfom1 no services 
other than those that are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable 
market for them does not exist." Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Ctr., 136 Idaho 579,584, 38 P.3d 617, 
622(2001 ). In evaluating whether a case falls in the Odd-Lot the determination turns upon whether 
the claimant, is, given the physical limitations and all non-medical factors, not "regularly 
employable in any well-known branch of the labor market absent a business boom, the sympathy 
of a particular employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on their part." 
Gooby v. Lake Shore 1\1anagement Co., 136 Idaho 79, 83, 29 P.3d 390, 394 (2001). 
Where due to conflicting evidence, the applicability of the Odd-Lot cannot be determined 
as a matter of law, the claimant has the burden of proving that there are no jobs regularly available 
to him in any well-known branch of the labor market. There are three paths for making the prima 
facie case. See, e.g. Huerta v. School Dist. No. 431, 116 Idaho 43, 47, 773 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1989). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16 
path applicable given the 111 case is "futility." To navigate this 
path claimant must show that any efforts of the employee to find suitable employment would 
been futile. Dumaw v. JL. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 1 795 P 3 1 3 15 ( 1 990) 
(the testimony of a vocational rehabilitation specialist that a worker had lost access to 80% of the 
market place otherwise available to him supported a finding that the claimant had made a prima 
facie case for Odd-lot status). 
While the Court does not appear to have explicitly defined "suitable" in this context, given 
that the point of any evidence is to demonstrate that the claimant falls within the Odd-Lot, "suitable 
employment" must perforce be employment in a well-known branch of the labor market which 
would be regularly available to the claimant, giving account to existing limitations/impairments, 
and not dependent upon a business boom, the sympathy of any employer or friends, temporary 
good luck, or superhuman effort. 
Here, after recognizing the conflicting evidence including the expert op11110ns, the 
Commission identified evidence relative to his age, education, employment history, language 
limitations and his functional limitations and the apparent worsening of his physical condition 
(involving overuse related problems in his left shoulder), it weighed the favorable and unfavorable 
non-medical factors and aspects of Mr. Rodriguez's employment history, and it concluded that it 
lacked any justification for altering the Referees determinations regarding weight and credibility 
of evidence. The Commission then found it was difficult to "believe that prospective employers, 
i.e. ones with no prior association with the Claimant, would preferentially hire Claimant over 
younger, physically able, unskilled workers." FOF, R.33 ##69-70. On this basis the Commission 
concluded that despite the conflicting evidence Mr. Rodriguez had successfully followed the path 
of "futility" and established that on a prima facie basis he fell within the Odd-Lot. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 17 
parties. The Commission found 
that determination do not appear to be challenged by either 
it was appropriate to considered both the Boise employment 
market and the Bonner's Ferry employment market. FOF, R. pp. 8-9 ## 14-15. Everyone seems 
to agree that Mr. Rodriguez has suffered a serious injury to his dominant hand and that his 
employability is adversely impacted by very real and very limiting non-medical factors. It is clear 
that everyone also agrees that he has been substantially disabled by the injury. Mr. Rodriguez's 
expert says given the applicable physical limitations he has lost access to 100% of the market place 
and will not be employable absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular employer or 
friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effo11. Employer's expert says that Mr. Rodriguez 
has lost access to up to 83% of the market place but that he is employable. 
Employer does not challenge these facts or these findings. Its challenge to the 
Commission's conclusion does not appear to be based upon a lack of substantial and competent 
evidence to support those conclusions. Employer's argument that the Commission erred in finding 
that Mr. Rodriguez had made a prima facie showing that he fit within the Odd-Lot proceeds on 
two tracks. Primarily, this argument is based upon the assertion that a prima facie Odd Lot 
showing based upon "futility" cannot be made where there is evidence that the Claimant turned 
down a "viable return-to-work" offer. Appellants' Brief, 18-20. Secondarily, Employer argues 
that the evidence which suggests that Mr. Rodriguez is employable is more reliable and persuasive 
than the evidence which supports a determination that he has made a prima facie showing for 
inclusion in the Odd-Lot. 
The assertion that Mr. Rodriguez cannot qualify for inclusion in the Odd-Lot by means of 
a "futility" showing where there is a return-to-work offer from the time of injury employer is 
flawed in several respects. First the assertion, as discussed in the preceding section, ignores the 
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to establishment a prima facie Odd-Lot showing. Second, the 
1s premised upon a - that all instances a specific job offer can defeat a 
generalized finding of inability to compete in any established market which apparently cannot 
find support among courts and commentators. Third, the assertion is premised upon a unfounded 
claim that a return-to-work offer (which the Commission found as genuinely tendered by Mr. 
Atkins but which was not shown to be physically suited to Mr. Rodriguez and was not shown to 
be continuously and regularly available) constitutes a "viable return-to-work offer" sufficient to 
prevent a determination that the prima facie case had been made. 
In sum, Employer's primary argument against the determination that Mr. Rodriguez had 
made a sufficient showing to establish a prima facie case for inclusion in the Odd-Lot is 
unfounded. Employer has not shown, based upon any identified law, decision or commentator 
discussion, that the existence of any return-to-work offer, let alone one that is not even suitable, 
precludes a finding that Mr. Rodriguez has established a prima facie Odd-Lot case. Indeed 
Employer has not shown any legal basis for the claim that the existence of a return-to-work offer 
is even relevant to the determination of whether Mr. Rodriguez has established a prima facie Odd-
Lot case. Lacking suppo1iing law for its theory, Employer pursues a secondary strategy -- arguing 
about factual findings made by the Commission based upon a record containing controverted 
testimony and hence irrevocably tied to "trier of fact" determinations about credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.3 
3 Consistent with the assertion that a single "return-to-work" offer is not relevant to the 
determination of "futility," the factual support for a finding that the return-to-work offer was not 
a sufficient basis to deny Mr. Rodriguez Odd-Lot status is discussed in the next section of this 
Brief. If the Court determines that a "futility" finding could be a barred by a return-to-work offer 
then the discussion below should be considered as applicable to the claim that the "return-to-work" 
offer made here is not one which demonstrates that Mr. Rodriguez is regularly employable in an 
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secondary to the finding that Mr. Rodriguez 
had established a prirna facie case for inclusion the Odd-Lot upon the testimony most favorable 
to its position but it fails to show how the facts relied upon by and available to the Commission do 
not constitute substantial and competent evidence. Employer's vocational expert, Mary Barros-
Bailey did testify that, if he were sufficiently motivated to work, Mr. Rodriguez could find work 
in the Boise area but she did not identify a single job that might be available to him (as opposed to 
some anonymous differently limited persons). But the record contained testimony from 
Employer's representative complementary of Mr. Rodriguez's work ethic and Mr. Rodriguez own 
testimony about his limitations, pain and drug related concerns. In addition, Mr. Rodriguez's 
vocational expert, Terry Montague, testified that in his view Mr. Rodriguez could not expect to 
find employment in the Boise market or the Bonner Ferry market. While the testimony is 
conflicting, the Commission could legitimately determine that Mr. Rodriguez was a reliable 
witness and that his testimony coupled with that of Mr. Montague deserved more weight that the 
testimony of Ms. Barros-Bailey. Employer, while arguing that the evidence deserves to be 
weighted differently has made no attempt to explain why the available evidence obviously relied 
upon by the Commission is not substantial and competent. Consequently this Court should uphold 
the Commission's determination. 
3. The Commission Correctly Ruled that Employer Failed to Establish That 
Mr. Rodriguez is in Fact Employable 
While Mr. Atkins proposed custom designed job cannot undermine the Commission's 
determination that Claimant had made prirna fizcie showing of qualifying for an Odd- Lot status, 
in any well-known branch of the labor market absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on their part. 
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was to deten11ination by proving Claimant was in fact employable. 
To rebut case, employer burden showmg that: 
1. There is an actual job; 
2. The job is regularly and continuously available; 
3. The job is located a reasonable distance from Claimant's home; 
4. The Claimant can "perform" the job or be trained to perform it; and, 
5. That Claimant has a reasonable opportunity to actually gain employment at that job. 
Lyons v. Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 406-07, 565 P.2d 1360, 1363-64 (1977). 
As the Commission correctly noted, this is not an easy burden to meet. See, e.g. Tarbet v. 
JR. Simplot Co~, 151 Idaho 755, 760, 264 P.3d 394, 399 (2011). The burden of showing the 
existence of a suitable job which is regularly and continuously available to a claimant is not a 
burden which can be met based upon job surveys showing the existence of jobs which are 
consistent with the claimant's limitations/restrictions, See, e.g., Nielson v. State of Idaho Industrial 
Indemnity Fund, 106 Idaho 878, 684, P .2d 280 ( 1984), or through the generalized opinions of 
vocational rehabilitation experts about the jobs theoretically available in the appropriate locality. 
See, e.g., Hoye v. DAW Forest Products, Inc., 125 Idaho 582, 585, 873 P.2d 836, 839 (1994). 
The Commission concluded that Employer failed to meet its burden of proving the 
existence of a suitable job that was regularly and continuously available. In making this finding 
the Commission noted both that the testimony of the vocational experts was conflicting as to Mr. 
Rodriguez's employability and that the record contained no adequate evidence of the existence of 
a specific job that was available to Mr. Rodriguez. The Commission did adopt the Referee's 
finding that Mr. Atkins offered to fashion a job for Mr. Rodriguez and that this offer was sincere 
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believable to constitute an "actual job." The Commission also found that the job 
was a distance from Bonner's - one the two "homes" which the 
considered to be relevant. Implicit in these two findings is a determination that Mr. 
Rodriguez had the "opportunity to gain employment at that job." These findings satisfied 3 of the 
5 elements of showing actual employability. 
As for the remaining elements of proof of actual employability Uob offered is a job that 
can be performed by the Plaintiff and job is continuously and regularly available), the Commission 
ruled that the record available to it did not support a finding in Employer's favor on either of these 
two points. FOF, R.35-37 ##73-75. This finding makes perfect sense. There was no evidence 
that given his limitations the job that was fashioned for him would put him in the "core group" that 
was pretty much guaranteed employment from March to November. There was no evidence that 
anyone had ever documented a specific job that Employer would be willing to pay him to perform 
and identified the specific tasks associated with that job so that appropriate health care providers 
could confirm that Mr. Rodriguez could perform that job. While Mr. Atkins as a friend with a 
need for Mr. Rodriguez's expertise could, in a boom market feel confident he could fashion a job 
that would fit Mr. Rodriguez's limitations no one testified that a non-physical job limited to 
irrigation supervision, nor any other job that Mr. Rodriguez could perform, would be available in 
low production years. 
Mr. Rodriguez however, with his extensive knowledge of the operations at Employer's 
farm clearly did not believe Mr. Atkins' best intentions could be actualized. Mr. Rodriguez tried 
a job intended to suit him and could not do it. He clearly and unequivocally testified the pain he 
suffered from simple non-work related movements like crossing himself and his view that the pain 
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he would 
his testimony. 
to take to work would make him unable to do his job. No one 
Given the available evidence and the lack of any evidence that any vocational expert had 
met with Employer and prepared a Job Site Evaluation for the specific job that was being offered 
coupled with the lack of any evidence that any Functional Capacity Evaluator or Physician had 
opined that the described job was within the Claimants' physical capacity, the Commission 
correctly detem1ined that "it is impossible to know whether the modified job, as described by Mr. 
Atkins, is one that Claimant retained the physical capacity to perform." FOF R. 35 # 73. Indeed it 
is impossible to determine the exact parameters of the job so it is also impossible to determine that 
the proposed modified job was physically suitable. 
Moreover, the Commission correctly determined the record would not support a finding 
that the modified job was a job that was "regularly and continuously" available. There was no 
evidence in the record to support a finding that the modified job, largely supervisory, is a job that 
would be available at any other hops farm anywhere else in Idaho, even to a person with Mr. 
Rodriguez's expertise, and hence no capacity to determine that the job is one that is regularly 
available in the Hops farming job market. \Vhile Mr. Akins, as Employer's current manager and 
a friend of Mr. Rodriguez - was found to be sincere in his willingness to make adequate work for 
Mr. Rodriguez, the evidence will not support a finding that the modified job is continuously 
available in the Hops farming job market or even at Employer's hops farm. In this regard, the 
evidence demonstrated both that there was significant volatility of the market for "hops" (in one 5 
years span Employer's fam1ed acreage varied from 300 acers to 1700) CDA Tr. 53:24 to 55:2, but 
also that it is the current boom market conditions that underlie Mr. Atkins ability to attempt to 
fashion a one of a kind job that Claimant can perform. CDA Tr.68:3-18 and 70:13-71:3. 
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it the Commission was justified in concluding that the job being 
not to that it had not been shown to be 
one which was continuously and regularly available. While the Commission did not expressly 
make a finding that the job that was offered was a make work job which was being was being 
fashioned solely for Mr. Rodriguez by a uniquely motivated manager/friend, it certainly was not 
provided with evidence that the job is one which could be expected to be found within the industry, 
in boom and bust markets and at Employer's farm if Mr. Atkins retired or was terminated. 
Employer can point to evidence which can be argued to lend some support a contrary 
determination but what it cannot do and has not done is demonstrate that the Commission erred in 
determining that Employer had failed to prove two of the three elements of the "available job 
defense" to an Odd-Lot finding. Indeed, the record contains sufficient substantial and competent 
evidence to support a finding that while demonstrating there was an "actual job" offered to Mr. 
Rodriguez it was not a job that fulfilled the elements of the "available job defense." 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Commission's determination 
conclusion that Mr. Rodriguez entitled to permanent and total disability benefits pursuant to the 
Odd-Lot doctrine, effective February 7, 2013, can be and should be upheld. 
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